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Maxfield: Wyoming's Equal Protection Clause Mandates Fiscal Neutrality in S

COMMENTS
WYOMING'S EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
MANDATES FISCAL NEUTRALITY IN
SCHOOL FUNDING
The financing of public schools in Wyoming is based
primarily on district and county property taxes.' The revenue derived from these taxes is utilized by each school
district solely within its respective county. Since assessed
property valuations vary extremely throughout the state, a
substantial disparity in the amount of money available for
public education exists among the state's forty-nine districts.' The property poor districts consistently have less
total revenue than the property rich districts based on
assessed valuation per student.' On June 28, 1978, three
Wyoming school districts and affected citizens residing
therein4 brought an action under the Wyoming Declaratory
Judgments Act' asking that the system of financing public
schools be declared violative of the Wyoming Constitution.'
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that under the present
system "the quality of a child's education in Wyoming . . . is
dependent upon the property tax resources of his school
district," and therefore the system does not afford equal
protection as guaranteed by the Wyoming Constitution.7
The court gave the legislature until July 1, 1983, to
implement a school funding plan which will pass constitutional muster.' This comment will: 1) explain the property
tax sources of school funding in Wyoming, 2) discuss the
court's analysis in Washakie County School District Number
Copyright@ 1981 by the University of Wyoming

1. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310,
323, 324 (Wyo. 1980).
2. Id. at 329-32.
3. Id. at 330.
4. Id. at 314.
(1977).

5.

WYO. STAT. §§ 1-37-101 through 1-37-115

6.

Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 314.

7. Id. at 332; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 34. "All laws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation."

8. Id. at 340.
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One v. Herschler,3) compare the Wyoming Supreme Court's
equal protection analysis to that employed by the U.S.
Supreme Court when deciding Fourteenth Amendment-equal
protection questions, 4) survey the school financing cases,
both in Wyoming and other states, 5) examine various
reform methods of school financing, and finally, 6) preview
the proposed new method of school funding in Wyoming.
I. DISTRICT WEALTH BASED
FINANCING-UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Pre-Washakie Sources of Funding-The Current System
The state legislature has the dual responsibility of:
1) providing a school system as a whole and 2) financing
it.' To accomplish the task of financing, the legislature may
draw from a broad spectrum of resources." ° However, the
mill levy property tax [also called the ad valorem tax] makes
up approximately 66% of the total revenue used for public
education." This is where most of the disparity of resources
available to school districts originates." Consequently, the
court in Washakie focused mainly on the property tax
sources of revenue for schools. 3
The state constitution has several provisions for levying
property taxes for school purposes:
1. A state tax of six mills may be levied each
year for the support of public education.1"
2. A mandatory county tax of twelve mills is
collected annually, and the proceeds are distributed
among the school districts within the county as the
legislature provides.1"
9. WYo. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
10. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 320, 323.
11. Id. at 322.
12. Id. at 324.
13. Id.
14. WYO. CONST. art. XV, § 15.
15. WYO. CONST. art. XV, § 17.
16. Wyo. CONST. art. XV, § 5.
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3. A part of the revenue derived from a county
tax not to exceed twelve mills on the dollar for all
county purposes may be collected annually. 16
4. The legislature has the power to make such
further provision "by taxation or otherwise" as
necessary to create a thorough and efficient system
of public education."7
These constitutional taxing provisions are implemented by
various statutes. The six mills state school tax levy is effectuated by Section 21-13-303 of the Wyoming Statutes. 8 The
revenue derived from this tax is transferred into the Wyoming School Foundation Program. 9 The purpose of the
foundation program is to guarantee a minimum education
for every child by providing financial assistance to those
local school districts with relatively fewer resources available to them. 0 The twelve mills mandatory county tax for
support of public schools is implemented by Section 21-13-201
of the Wyoming Statutes.' This tax is collected by the
county treasurer and distributed as directed by the state
superintendent of schools to the school districts in that
county. Of the twelve mills general county tax, a maximum
of three mills may be used for school purposes. 2
Each of the three property tax sources of school funding
discussed above are expressly authorized by the state constitution. 3 One additional property tax source of school
funding, a special school district tax, has statutory author2
ization.24 Section 21-13-101 of the Wyoming Statutes
allows a tax of up to ". . . twenty-eight mills for combined
17. WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 9.
18.

WYO. STAT. § 21-13-303

(1977).

19. WYo. STAT. §§ 21-13-305 to 21-13-314 (1977), as amended.
20. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 322. The foundation program has other sources aside from the six mills
levy. All state money for elementary and secondary education is placed
in this fund. WYO.STAT. § 21-13-306 (1977).
21. WYO. STAT. § 21-13-201 (1977).

22. WYo. STAT. § 21-13-205 (1977).
23.

The six mills state tax by article XV, section 15 of the Wyoming Constitution; the twelve mills mandatory county tax for support of public school
by article XV, section 17 of the Wyoming Constitution; the twelve mills
general county tax for all county purposes by article XV, section 5 of the
Wyoming Constitution.

24. WYO.STAT. § 21-13-101 (1977).
25. Id.
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elementary and high school purposes, three mills of which
shall not be levied except with the approval of the majority
of voters voting on the proposition," to be levied for all
school purposes."0 However, this tax finds no explicit textual support in the state constitution. 7 The Washakie court
stated that the special district tax might be allowable under
the general terms of article VII, section 9 of the Wyoming
Constitution." However, the special district levy raises more
revenue than the combined sum of all other ad valorem levies
for school purposes, 9 and the court concluded that this tax
was the principal cause of the substantial interdistrict disparity of school funding.8"
The Court's Analysis in Washakie
The Washakie court engaged in strict judicial scrutiny
of the Wyoming system of financing public education.'
Under the Wyoming Supreme Court's analysis, if a fundamental interest is affected or if a classification is inherently
suspect, then strict judicial scrutiny shall be invoked in
order to determine whether the classification is necessary
to achieve a compelling state interest.2 If strict judicial
scrutiny is applied, then those defending the classification
have the burden of proving it fulfills a compelling state
interest and that no less onerous alternative classifications
are available."
Both a fundamental right and an inherently suspect
classification were found to be present in Washakie 4 The
court relied on article I, section 23, and article XXI, section
26. Id.
27. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 335.
28. Id. at 321. Article VII, Section 9 of the Wyoming Constitution provides:
"The legislature shall make such further provision by taxation or otherwise,
as with the income arising from the general school fund will create and
maintain a thorough and efficient system of public schools, . .
29. Id. at 335.
30. Id. at 324.
31. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 333.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 333-34.
34. Id.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/8
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28 of the Wyoming constitution35 to support its conclusion
that education of the children of Wyoming is of fundamental
importance under the state constitution. 6 The court also
emphasized the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
proposition"7 that education may be the most important
function that state and local governments perform, and the
right to education should be available to all on equal terms."
The Wyoming program of funding public schools was
found to be a function of local wealth, since it was based
primarily on local ad valorem taxes. 9 Citing Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections,4" the Washakie court held that,
"A classification on the basis of wealth is considered suspect
especially when applied to fundamental interests."'" Even
though funds in the foundation program were distributed to
the school districts in accordance with need, there was not
enough revenue in the foundation to raise the poor counties
to the level of the rich counties. 2 The substantial difference
in total revenue among districts is illustrated by Appendix
A to the Washakie opinion.4" The Campbell County and Hot
Springs County School Districts had total revenue per
average daily membership of $3299 and $3033, respectively.
The Niobrara County and Park County School Districts had
total revenue per average daily membership of $2124 and
$1759, respectively. Without the aid of a prior trial on the
merits and a full and complete record,45 the Wyoming Su35. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 23, reads: "The right of citizens to opportunities for
education should have practical recognition. The legislature shall suitably
encourage means and agencies calculated to advance the sciences and
liberal arts." WYo. CONST. art. XXI, § 28, reads: "The legislature shall
make laws for the establishment and maintenance of systems of public
schools which shall be open to all the children of the state and free from
sectarian control."
36. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 333.
37. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
38. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 333-34.
39. Id. at 335.
40. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668, 670 (1968).
41. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 334.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 338-39.
44. Id.
45. The District Court, Hot Springs County, granted the state's motion to dismiss. Id. at 311.
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preme Court concluded a priori that without equality of
financing, equality of educational opportunity in Wyoming
cannot be achieved, and therefore equal protection is being
denied.4" The court did not specifically say who was denied
equal protection. While it is arguable that all school children
in the state of Wyoming except those in the wealthiest school
districts are the victims, the language in the Washakie
opinion seems to indicate that the relatively poorer counties
are the ones being denied this constitutional guarantee. 7
The state did not adequately show that a less burdensome
alternative method of financing public schools was available, and therefore the court declared the entire system
48
unconstitutional.
The court pointed out that no single element of the
system standing alone violates the constitution, but gave
several hints as to "highly suspect" statutes and potential
solutions." After Washakie, the special district tax,5" which
authorizes a twenty-five mills levy with a three mills override if approved by the voters, is probably unconstitutional
under the present system.5" This tax is greater than the sum
of the six mills state tax, the twelve mills mandatory county
tax for support of public schools, and the three mills from the
general county tax which may be used for school purposes.2
Further, it is the only one of these taxes which does not have
express constitutional authorization. 3 The assessed property
valuations vary substantially among school districts," and
the vast majority of school districts are levying the maximum
tax allowed by statute without a voter override.5" Therefore,
the special school district tax levied and utilized solely by
46. Id. at 334.
47. Id. "It would be unacceptable logic to deduce that the wealthy counties
are squandering their money merely from the fact that the poor counties
are getting along just fine and providing an adequate education on the
lesser amounts per child they have."
48. Id.
49. Id. at 335-37.
50. Wyo. STAT. § 21-13-101 (1977).
51. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 335.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 332, 335.
54. Id. at 328.
55. WYo. STAT. § 21-13-101 (1977); Washakie County School District Number
One v. Herschler, supra note 1, at 326-27.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/8
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each school district within its respective county is the single
greatest factor causing the significant disparity in financial
resources among the school districts. In Washakie, the court
suggested an investigation be conducted on the feasibility
of levying the special school district tax on a statewide basis
and then paying the revenue therefrom into the foundation
fund or other state fund."6 The revenue from this state fund
would then be paid out to the school districts in accordance
with "a legislative formula on an equitable basis throughout
the state."'
The distributive scheme of income derived from school
lands was also singled out by the Washakie court as constitutionally suspect. 8 Whereas the court condemned other
statutes under an equal protection analysis, it earmarked
the School Land Income distribution scheme a likely violator
of article VII, section 8, of the Wyoming Constitution, as
amended."0 This provision requires that school funds be
°
equitably allocated among all school districts in the state."
1
Before 1979, Section 21-13-301, of the Wyoming Statutes"
provided for distribution "pro rata among the several counties of the state according to the number of children of
school age in each as determined by reference to the last
preceding annual school enumeration." Amended in 1979,
this Section now provides for distribution "pro rata among
the several counties of the state according to the number of
children of school age in each as determined by the average
daily membership"2 of the school districts within each county
for the preceding school year."6 " Distribution pursuant to
this statute on the basis of average daily membership of the
56.
57.
58.
59.

60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 836.
Washakie County School District Number One v. Hersehler, supra note 1,
at 336. Article VII, section 8 of the Wyoming Constitution (Cum. Supp.
1980) provides: "The legislature shall make such further provision by
taxation or otherwise, as with the income arising from the general school
fund will create and maintain a thorough and efficient system of public
schools, . . ."
WYo. CONST. art. VIi, § 8 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
WYO. STAT. § 21-13-301 (1977).
Average daily membership is approximately equal to number of pupils.
Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 322 n. 14.
Wyo. STAT. § 21-13-301 (Cum. Supp. 1980).

63. by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981
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school districts is not likely to pass constitutional muster
after Washakie. To satisfy the constitutional criterion of
"equitable allocation", 4 the court suggested that this revenue be placed in the foundation fund."5
Further, the Washakie court noted that the present
method of financing capital projects with which to carry
on the process of education was "tarred with the same brush
of disparate tax resources" as the other aspects of the financing system. To be constitutional, the new funding program
will have to provide for statewide availability of state resources for the financing of physical facilities on an equal
basis for all school districts."
Clearly the method of providing public education must
not be based on the wealth of the school district in order
to comply with the state equal protection guarantee. In
addition, there is a restraint imposed by article VII, section
8 of the Wyoming Constitution which requires the "equitable allocation" of school income funds." Precise dollar for
dollar input per student is not mandated, and allowances
for such things as local impact and rural factors must be
made."9 All of this places a heavy burden upon the legislature
to devise a new financing system which can withstand the
Wyoming Supreme Court's rigorous constitutional analysis.
II. COMPARISON OF WYOMING AND FEDERAL
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

The equal protection analysis engaged in by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Washakie differs in several material
respects from that employed by the United States Supreme
Court when deciding questions under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. It is important to understand the distinctions
64. WYo. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
65. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, 8upra note 1,
at 322 n. 14.
66. Id. at 337.
67. Id.
68. WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
69. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herscher, supra note 1,
at 336.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/8
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between the two types of analysis, because the result in an
equal protection case may hinge solely upon whether the
state or the federal equal protection provision is appiled. 0
The system of financing public education in Texas and
Wyoming are comparable: both rely heavily on the local ad
valorem property tax to raise revenues to be used in local
schools.' In addition, both states have substantial inter2
district disparities in school expenditures. The Washakie
court found both a fundamental interest and a suspect classification and applied strict scrutiny to Wyoming's finan-

cing system,"3 whereas the U.S. Supreme Court in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez found
4
neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification,"

and applied the rational relationship test to the method of
financing education in Texas. 5 When the rationality test is

applied, as opposed to strict judicial scrutiny, the court will

7
presume a legislative classification is valid. " The party at-

tacking the classification can prevail only by showing that it

is inherently arbitrary." This is a heavy burden, because the
classification will be upheld if any set of facts can reasonably
be conceived that would sustain it." Thus, it is difficult to
invalidate legislation in an equal protection attack unless
70. See, Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, and Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929.
In Serrano I the California Supreme Court declared the California system
of financing public education unconstitutional because it violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Id. at 1251-52. In a footnote to the Serrano I opinion, the court indicated
that the state equal protection provision also was applicable because it
was "substantially the equivalent" of the federal equal protection guarantee. Id. at 1249 n. 11. Nevertheless, the Serrano I decision rested squarely
on the federal constitution. Id. at 1249-63. The U.S. Supreme Court in
Rodriguez upheld the ad valorem based system of financing public education in Texas, finding no denial of equal protection. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 611 U.S. 1, 2 (1972). The California
court in Serrano II, modified its Serrano I opinion, without changing the
result, by grounding the holding of unconstitutionality solely in the state
constitution's equal protection clause. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 95255 (1977).
71. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 6-15
(1972). Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra
note 1, at 324.
72. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 324.
73. Id. at 333-34.
74. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra note 71, at
18.
75. Id. at 2.
76. Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
77. Id.
78. Id.
Published
by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981
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heightened scrutiny is invoked. Since either the requisite
interference with a fundamental right or the disproportionate impact upon a suspect classification will trigger
strict judicial scrutiny," the criteria a court uses to define
a right that is fundamental or a classification that is suspect
becomes critical.
Assessing a Fundamental Right
The Washakie court held that education for Wyoming
children is a fundamental right because of its importance.8"
Two provisions of the Wyoming Constitution emphasize the
importance of education and direct the legislature to establish and maintain free public schools open to all children of
the state. 1 The Washakie court cited Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka" to support its proposition that education is essential and might be the most important function
that state and local governments perform. 3 However, the
U.S. Supreme Court in Rodriguez rejected the idea that a
right was fundamental simply because of its importance;
holding instead that a right in order to be fundamental
must either be explicitly or implicity guaranteed by the
constitution. 4 The Wyoming Supreme Court could have
applied the Rodriguez analysis and still reached the Washakie
result by interpreting article XXI, section 28, of the Wyoming Constitution as either explicitly or implicitly guaranteeing a right to education. 5 While Wyoming is not the
only state to dismiss the Rodriguez approach to assessing
fundamental rights," the practice of subjecting a classification to strict judicial scrutiny merely because the right
affected is important sets a precedent with uncertain ramifi79. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 333.
80. Id. at 333-34.
81. WYO. CONST. art. I, § 23, Wyo. CONST. art. XXI, § 28.
82. Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, supra note 37.
83. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 333-34.
84. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra note 71, at 33.
85. WYo. CONST. art. XXI, § 28 reads: "The legislature shall make laws for
the establishment and maintenance of systems of public schools which shall
be open to all the children of the state and free from sectarian control."
86. See Serrano v. Priest, supra note 70, at 952; Horton v. Meskll, 376 A.2d
359, 373-74 (Conn. 1977).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/8
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cations. Under the U.S. Supreme Court's approach, heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause is carefully
circumscribed. Only certain established constitutional rights
are characterized as fundamental and thereby subjected to
strict scrutiny.8 ' The rationale seems to be that since
these rights are constitutional guarantees, they warrant
the Court's utmost protection. 8 Such rights include the
right to travel," to vote,90 and to marry."' The Washakie
court's approach of deeming a right to be fundamental if
it is important enough could expand this list to such things
as the right to police and fire protection. While these are
both very important functions of state and local government, the practice of subjecting a legislative plan for dealing
with these rights to strict scrutiny tends to place the court
in a legislative role. 2
The Requisite Level of Interference
In order for strict scrutiny to be applied, a higher level
of interference with a fundamental right is required under
the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution than
under the substantially equivalent clause of the Wyoming
Constitution." In Washakie, all that was required for the
heightened level of judicial review to be invoked was for
the fundamental right of education to be affected." Since
all legislation concerning education will "affect" education,
the court opened the door for the application of strict
scrutiny to all such classifications. The U.S. Supreme Court,
on the other hand, usually looks for a penalty on the exercise
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642-44 (1969) (concurring opinion).
Id.
Id. at 638.
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, supra note 40.
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
See, San Antonio Independent School District v.Rodriguez, supra note 71,
at 31. The opinion of the. Court notes that if fundamentality were determined by the importance of a right, the Court would be going far towards
being a "super-legislature".
93. WYo. CONST. art. I, § 34.
94. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
Publishedat
by333.
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of a fundamental right. 5 An interference which does not
rise to the level of a penalty or serve as an absolute bar to
the exercise of a fundamental right triggers the rationality
test, not heightened scrutiny. In Sosna v. Iowa, where a
state statute imposed a one year durational residency requirement upon those seeking a divorce in the Iowa courts,
the Supreme Court upheld the statute even though it adversely affected the fundamental right to travel from state
to state, because it did not completely bar the plaintiff from
obtaining some part of what she sought. 6 The Sosna Court
distinguished Shapiro v. Thompson 7 on the basis that in
Shapiro, the plaintiff was "irretrievably foreclosed" from
securing a portion of what she was seeking. The Shapiro
Court applied strict scrutiny to a state statute which imposed a one year durational residency requirement on those
seeking welfare. 99
By applying the rationality test to classifications which
do not rise to the level of a penalty or serve as an absolute
bar upon the exercise of a fundamental right, the U.S.
Supreme Court has deferred to the legislature the power to
implement classifications which merely affect fundamental
rights as long as they have a conceivably rational relationship to a legitimate state end. However, in Washakie, only
a showing of an effect upon a fundamental right was required.' 0 This indicates a willingness by the court to tread
upon what would otherwise be the legislature's territory.
95. See, Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), where
the Court held that a state statute requiring a year's residence in a county
as a condition upon an indigent's obtaining nonemergency hospitalization
or medicare penalized the constitutional right of interstate migration. Also
see, Shapiro v. Thompson, supra note 87, where a statute which conditioned
the right to receive welfare upon a one year's prior residence in the state
was struck down as a penalty upon the exercise of a fundamental right. But
see, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), where the Court merely
required the classification to significantly interfere with the fundamental

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

right to marry before invoking strict scrutiny.
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406 (1975).
Shapiro v. Thompson, supra note 87.
Sosna v. Iowa, supra note 96.
Shapiro v. Thompson, supra note 87.
Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 333.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/8
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Wealth as a Suspect Classification
The wealth discrimination ascertained in Washakie to
create a suspect classification is substantially different from
any type of wealth discrimination reviewed by the U.S.
0 1 The salient distinction is that the U.S.
Supreme Court."
Supreme Court will not deem a classification to be suspect
unless it discriminates against a class that is saddled with
disabilities or has historically been subjected to purposeful
discrimination.' Wealth discrimination was at least one
basis for the U.S. Supreme Court invoking strict scrutiny
in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections.' However, the
statute being attacked in Harper, conditioning the right to
vote upon the payment of a poll tax, discriminated against
poor people as a class.' Poor people clearly satisfy the
Supreme Court's prerequisite of having suffered through a
history of disabilities. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court faced
a classification that burdened poor school districts,"°5 which
is precisely what the Wyoming Supreme Court confronted
in Washakie. °6 The Rodriguez Court held that discrimination on the basis of district wealth did not create a suspect
classification, because a district does not have any of the
"traditional indicia of suspectness..'' Not requiring a past
history of discrimination and disability, the Washakie court
found that a district wealth based classification is suspect.0 8
Even when the U.S. Supreme Court finds that a classification burdens the poor, wealth discrimination alone, with
101. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra note 71, at
18-19.
102. Id. at 28.
103. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, supra note 40. In Harper,a statute
conditioning the right to vote upon the payment of a poll tax was struck
down under the equal protection clause. Id. at 666. Both a suspect classification on the basis of wealth and the infringement of the fundamental
right to vote triggered strict scrutiny. Id. at 667-69.
104. Id. at 668-69.
105. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra note 71, at 28.
106. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 334.
107. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra note 71, at
28.
108. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
Published at
by 334.
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is not sufficient to trigger strict

scrutiny.110

In addition to finding wealth discrimination in
Harper,"' the Court held that conditioning the right to vote
upon the payment of a poll tax infringed upon the fundamental right to vote."' Since the Washakie court found both
a suspect classification based on wealth and the requisite
interference with a fundamental right,"3 the case is probably not precedent for the proposition of triggering strict
scrutiny when only wealth discrimination is found. Our state
has many instances of the government charging everyone
the same price for its services regardless of ability to pay.
For example, university tuition, hunting licenses, and automobile licensing fees are the same for rich and poor. Clearly,
the indigent may be unable to pay for one or all of these.
However, this does not mean these classifications will be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. It is simply the way
our society functions. If in the future the Wyoming Supreme
Court strictly scrutinizes classifications which only defacto
discriminate on the basis of wealth, then the state's political
structure stands to be drastically changed.
III. THE FLOOD OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
Previous Wyoming Decisions
The legislature addressed the problem of unequal resources available for school funding among school districts
109. See, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), where the Court applied
due process strict scrutiny to strike down a state statute which imposed
filing fees upon all persons seeking a divorce, because it restricted poor
people from bringing such an action. Id. at 372. The Court held that
since the state had monopolized the means for legally dissolving a marriage, due process prohibited denial of access to the courts for those seeking
a divorce solely because of inability to pay. Id. at 374. See also, United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), and Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977), where the Court refused to extend the Boddie Court's application
of strict scrutiny of wealth based classification to cases where the state
did not monopolize the means for obtaining an adjudication of bankruptcy and an abortion, respectively.
In cases dealing with the criminal justice system, certain rights can
not be denied the indigent defendant. See, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956), where the Court held indigent defendants had a right to be
provided with trial transcripts. See also, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963) where indigent defendant was found to have the right to be
provided with counsel for the first appeal.
110. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra note 71,
at 29.
111. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, supra note 40, at 668.
112. Id. at 667.
113. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note
1, at 333-34.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/8
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when it passed the Wyoming School District Organization
Law of 1969.1" The purpose of this chapter was to provide
an improved and more equalized education opportunity for
all pupils in Wyoming and to reduce the disparity of resources available for education among school districts.1"
The flaw in the Wyoming School Districts Organization
Law of 1969 is that it only reduces the disparity of available resources per classroom unit among the school districts
in their respective counties and not among all the school
districts in the state.1 '
In Sweetwater County Planning Committee for the
Organization of School Districts v. Hinkle,' 1 the controversy centered on the property rich Bairoil school system
and which unified school district would merge with it. The
Wyoming Supreme Court recognized that the Wyoming
School District Organization Law of 1969 did not sufficiently reduce the disparity in the amount of resources
available per classroom unit to school districts and stated:
We see no manner in which ad valorem taxes
for school purposes can be made equal and uniform
unless it is done on a statewide basis. In other words,
all property owners within the state should be required to pay the same total mill levy for school
purposes."' 8
The court then proposed that the legislature provide a system
for a uniform property tax to be levied throughout the state
for purposes of school financing.1 ' Funds derived from this
levy [excluding the constitutionally mandated twelve mills
county levy for school purposes] would be transmitted to
the state treasurer.' ° The state superintendent of education
would then direct the state treasurer to proportionally distribute these funds so that each district would receive "the
same share per classroom unit, when the allotment from the
114. WYo. STAT. § 21-5-102 (1977).

115. id.
116. Sweetwater County Planning Committee for the Organization of School
Districts v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234, 1236-37 (Wyo. 1971).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1237.
119. Id. at 1237-38.
120. Id.
Published
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countywide twelve mills school levy and the additional allotment from the state treasurer are added together.

' 12 1

Two

months after retaining jurisdiction until the close of the
next legislative session, the court relinquished its jurisdiction in Hinkle.

22

However, the court reaffirmed its position

that the legislature should take the necessary steps to equalize revenue derived from ad valorem taxes for school purposes on a statewide basis instead of the countywide basis
provided for in the Wyoming School District Organization
Law of 1969.123
The Wyoming court again enunciated the principle of
reducing the disparity of per pupil valuation among school
districts on the basis of statewide action in Johnson v.
Schrader.2"' 4 The court rejected Goshen County's school district reorganization plan because of the substantial disparity
of funding per pupil among the four proposed districts in
the county. 5 In dictum, the Johnson court correctly foresaw
that the issue of equalization of school funding might necesaction because of possible equal
sarily expand into statewide
16
protection violations.

Decisions Outside Wyoming
Other state courts have dealt with the question of unequal funding of education among school districts. In Serrano
v. Priest, the California Supreme Court held that the state
school financing system based heavily on local property
taxes, with concomitant disparity among school districts in
the amount of resources available per pupil for education,
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.2 7 The Serrano court
121. Id. at 1238.
122. Sweetwater County Planning Committee for the Organization of School
Districts v. Hinkle, 493 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Wyo. 1972).
123. Id. at 1051.
124. Johnson v. Schrader, 507 P.2d 814 (Wyo. 1973). Johnson, along with
Hinkle, was brought pursuant to the Wyoming school District Organization
Law of 1969. In Johnson, the County Committee of Goshen County formulated a reorganization plan which the committee admitted did not comply with the Wyoming School District Reorganization Law of 1969.
125. Id. at 816.
126. Id.
127. Serrano v. Priest, supra note 70.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/8
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applied a two-tier test for evaluating the allegedly unconstitutional funding method.' 28 The court applied strict judicial scrutiny, because education was deemed to be of fundamental importance" 9 and concluded the property tax funding system created a suspect classification, because it invidiously discriminated against the poor. 3 ' Since the state did
not show any compelling interest which necessitated that
particular system of financing, the court found that the
California scheme of funding public schools violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
In a footnote to the opinion, the court indicated that the
of the equivalent provision of the
system also ran afoul
132
state constitution.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
invalidated the Serrano decision insofar as it held the CaliThe
fornia system contravened the federal constitution.'
Supreme Court in applying the traditional two-tier equal
protection test, stated that education was not a fundamental
right under the U.S. Constitution. 3 1 Since the Texas system
did not disadvantage a suspect classification or interfere
with a fundamental right, strict judicial scrutiny was not
triggered.' The Court merely required that the method of
school funding be rationally related to a legitimate state
end. 186 In a strong dissent, Marshall sharply criticized the
majority opinion as a retreat from the Court's "historic
commitment to equality of educational opportunity."' 3 7 Marshall accepted the proposition that education is a fundamental right and therefore would have applied heightened
scrutiny, because he felt education was "intimately related"
to basic first amendment and political freedoms.138
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1255-59.
Id. at 1250-55.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1249 n. 11.
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, supra note 71, at
2.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 71 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 110-17.
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In deference to the Rodriguez decision, the California
Supreme Court issued a modified opinion on Serrano v.
Priest.'9 The Serrano II court held that even though the
school financing system was valid under the U.S. Constitution, it violated the equal protection provision of the state
constitution. 4 ' Adhering to its findings in Serrano I, education was deemed a fundamental right guaranteed by the
state constitution, and the financing program was held to
discriminate against a suspect classification. 4' Strict scrutiny was therefore invoked and the school funding scheme
was struck down."'
The states that have litigated the issue of unequal
financing among school districts have resolved it in a
variety of ways. New Jersey's method of funding schools
was struck down because it did not provide a "thorough
and efficient" education for all students as guaranteed by
the state constitution.' 3 The Wyoming constitution contains
a similar "thorough and efficient" provision;... however,
the Washakie court's decision was based instead on the state
equal protection provision. 5 The Washington Supreme Court
held that state's funding system unconstitutional, 4 ' and
mandated a system which provided for a "basic education"
for all children."' In the wake of Rodriguez, some states
have rejected challenges to their school funding systems. In
Shofstall v. Hollins,' 8 the Arizona Supreme Court held that
state's financing program provided a "general and uniform"
system of education as required under the Arizona constitution and found no equal protection violations. Similarly, the
Idaho Supreme Court, in upholding the state's financing
program, held the differences in the amounts available for
education among the state's school districts did not deny
Serrano v. Priest, supra note 70.
Id. at 953.
Id. at 951.
Id.
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 9.
Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra, note
1, at 332.
146. Seattle School District Number One of King City v. State, 585 P.2d 71,
104 (Wash. 1978).
147. Id. at 98.
148. Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (1973).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/8
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139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
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equal protection under the state constitution,14 nor was it
violative of the constitutional mandate of a uniform system
of public schools. 5 °
IV.

SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM:

DEFINITION-METHODS-LITIGATION

Equal Educational Opportunity-Inputs v. Outputs
Not all courts are in accord in the definition of equal
educational opportunity [EEdO]. Some states, including
Wyoming, define EEdO in terms of equalizing inputs. This
standard focuses on the equalization of: (1) resources expended, (2) tax effort per educational expenditure, and
(3) program options.' Several deviations from an absolute
equal inputs standard are necessary because of the varying
educational needs of children.' 52 For instance, urban school
districts, because of higher price and wage rates, spend more
per pupil for educational programs than do rural districts,' 3
but rural districts generally have higher transportation costs
per pupil than do their urban counterparts. The difficulties
of providing a truly equal educational opportunity become
evident upon the realization that one district may utilize its
revenue more efficiently than another. This presents the
question of whether the wasteful district should be awarded
more revenue than its more efficient neighbor in order to
equalize the actual inputs utilized by each student.
Advocating an education funding system which equalizes inputs, the Washakie court stated, "Equality of dollar
input is manageable. . . It is nothing more than an illusion
to believe that extensive disparity in financial resources
does not relate directly to quality of education."' 54 However,
absolute dollar for dollar equality per student was not recom149. Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975).
150. Id.
151. COHN, ECONOMICS OF STATE Am TO EDUCATION 28 (1974).
152. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note 1,
at 336.
153. Comment, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation, 1977
DuKE L. J. 1115 (1977).
154. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note
at Law
334. Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981
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mended,' 55 and the court warned that a flat rate per student
distribution scheme would probably be unconstitutional.' 56
Instead, the court proposed a state formula be devised which
accounts for "balancing factors" so that special needs can
be compensated for.'57
The major shortcoming of the inputs standard is that
it does not guarantee statewide equalization of achievement
test scores and college entrance exams, even though adjustment in the standard is made for such cost differentials as
rural and impact factors.5 8 The Wyoming Supreme Court
recognized this proposition when it acknowledged that there
are other factors besides money which affect the quality of
education.' 59 However, because the effect of these other
factors can not be accurately measured or compared, the
court concluded that equality of dollar input is the only
viable criterion that exists. 6 '
A further standard which may have been employed
by at least one court is the outputs measure.'' To equalize
outputs, the focus is upon the end product, such as student
achievement and societal benefits.' The obvious difficulty
with this standard is in determining what inputs are necessary in order to equalize outputs.'
The court in McInnis v. Shapiro' rejected the outputs
standard because there were no manageable standards which
155. Id. at 336.
156. Id. The court said a flat rate per student distribution scheme would likely
be violative of: 1) article XV, section 17 of the Wyoming Constitution,
which mandates a twelve mill county levy, and 2) article VII, section 5 of
the Wyoming Constitution, which fines and penalties to be paid to the
counties.
157. Id.
158. Presentation given by Representative Jack Sidi, Chairman, of Select Committee to Study School Finance. Representative Sidi explained the mechanics of the Select Committee's proposed new system of financing public education in Wyoming. The notes are on file in the Land and Water Law
Review office. (January 18, 1981).
159. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note
1, at 334.
160. Id.
161. Robinson v. Cahill, supra note 143, at 295. See also, Comment, Current
Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation, 1977 DUKE L. J. 1109-10
(1977).
162. COHN, ECONOMICS OF STATE AID TO EDUCATION 28 (1974).
163. Comment, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation, 1977 DUKE
L. J. 1110 (1977).
164. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 355 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd sub non

mem., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/8
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a court could apply to determine whether the system was
constitutional. 165 Empirical research is not yet able to predict what inputs are necessary in order to produce an equalized output for students, especially since their backgrounds
6
and capabilities are quite often extremely varied. '
Alternative Designs for School Financing
Wealth based financing systems have been replaced in
numerous states by an assortment of methods designed to
provide equal educational opportunity. These reform plans
all have two common characteristics: 1) increased role of
the state in the financing scheme, and 2) rejection of the
principle that the quality of education in terms of dollars
expended can be primarily dependent on district wealth.
This section will discuss four basic systems which many
states have relied on in enacting reform legislation. However, this is by no means an exclusive list of school finance
reform methods."'
1. District Power Equalization: At least nine states
6
have adopted a power equalization format. ' Basically, this
program allows school districts to choose how much they
wish to spend per pupil for education without making education a function of local wealth.' 9 In other words, an ad
valorem tax effort of ten mills in the poorest district will
return the same amount of revenue per weighted pupil as
°
the equivalent tax effort in the richest district.' The state
determines by formula the average amount of revenue raised
per weighted pupil [or classroom unit or some other distribution unit] by a given mill levy.'"' If the district levy raises
actual funds in excess of the stipulated amount [or average]
165. Id.
166. Comment, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation, 1977 DUKE
L. J.1110 (1977).
167. For an excellent review of alternative financing systems, See, COHN, ECONOMICS OF STATE AIE TO EDUCATION (1974).
168. Thomas, Equalizing Educational Opportunity Through School Finance
Reform: A Review Assessment, 48 UNIV. OF CINCINNATI L. REV. 225, 307
(1979).
169. COONS, CLUNE AND SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION,
201 (1970).

170.
171.

COHN, ECONOMICS OF STATE AID TO EDUCATION, 35 (1974).
COONS, CLUNE, AND SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCTATION,

Published204-209
by Law(1970).
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set by the state, then the excess must be transferred to the
state." 2 Conversely, the state will pay the difference to a
district in the event the stipulated amount exceeds the
actual revenues raised.17 District power equalizing proposals
often place a "ceiling" above which the districts are not
allowed to spend."7 4 The two reasons generally given for this
feature are: 1) spending above a certain maximum level
yields "only the slimmest marginal returns and may be frivolous," and 2) DPE plans contain a degree of budgetary
uncertainty; therefore a ceiling will protect the state treasury. "' 5 A "floor" or minimum spending level is often set by
the state which designates the least amount a district is permitted to spend.' This allows the state to avoid the possibility that a district would allow the quality of the school
systems to deteriorate in order to avoid taxes. 7 Substantial
underfunding of education could lead to increased crime,
unemployment, and welfare. 8
The principle advantage of power equalization is that
it allows each school district to select the level of spending
for education it desires without making the choice a function of local wealth.'79 Each district has the power to increase or decrease the amount of revenue available for
education. 18 0 One possible disadvantage of a DPE plan is
that while it does not make the quality of a child's education dependent upon district wealth, it still conditions it
upon the willingness of a district to tax at a given level.
On the other hand, allowing each district to choose how
much revenue it wishes to raise is arguably beneficial, because it encourages the efficient use of school revenue and
enables the school districts to have more control over education.
172. COHN, ECONOMICS OF STATE AID TO EDUCATION, 35 (1974).
173. Id.
174. GUTHRIE, EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCING: DISTRICT PowER EQUALIZING 10
(1975).
175. Id. at 9-10.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. COONS, CLUNE, AND SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
202 (1970).
180. Id.
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2. Foundation Program: The traditional foundation
system is based on the premise that no child's education
8
will be allowed to fall below a certain expenditure level. '
Although the Rodriguez Court indicated that school systems
should provide an opportunity for each child to obtain "basic
minimal skills" requisite for the full enjoyment of speech
and political rights, 8 ' most state courts see foundation programs as providing a minimum level of spending.8 ' Since
the courts in Wyoming and various other states have mandated that education provide for an equal educational opportunity, the traditionalfoundation program by itself cannot
convert a financing system which depends heavily on local
property taxes into one which is not a function of local
wealth. 4 Even if some wealthy districts receive no state
aid, they may still be able to raise more revenue than those
districts receiving foundation funds.'86 Thus, the quality of
a child's education remains dependent upon the property
wealth of his school district.
If the mechanics of the foundation program were
changed so that it provided an equal education as opposed
to a minimum education, then it would appear this program
alone could enable the financing system to meet the Washakie
court's mandate of not making the quality of a child's education a function of district wealth." 6 The plan would
require state taxes to be increased [and local taxes to be
correspondingly decreased] to a level which would yield
enough revenue to bring all school districts up to an even
keel with the wealthiest school district. A ceiling on local
taxes would have to be set in order to prevent wealthy
districts from raising more revenue than those districts
receiving foundation funds. Theoretically, all but the wealthiest school district would be receiving state aid. An alterna181.

THE PHI DELTA KAPPA COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR FUNDING

PUBLIC EDUCATION, FINANCING THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 45 (1973).
182. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 8tsra note 71, at
37.
183. THE PHI DELTA KAPPA COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR FUNDING
PUBLIC EDUCATION, FINANCING THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 45 (1973).
184. COHN, ECONOMICS OF STATE AM TO EDUCATION 85, 36 (1974).
Id. at 35.
Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, eupra note 1
Publishedatby336.
Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981
185.
186.
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tive to increasing state taxes and decreasing local taxes
would be for the state to recapture local property tax revenue for placement in the foundation program. However,
as will be discussed below, the state recapture of all or a
portion of locally levied taxes faces the possibility of being
87
unconstitutional. 1

3. Foundation Program Supplemented by DPE: At
least three states have adopted education funding systems
which combine both the foundation program and DPE.9 8
This technique provides for a DPE program to be used
"over the top" of a state's minimum foundation level formula, and thereby allows the benefits of both programs to
be enjoyed.' 89 A district is guaranteed a minimum education
for each student by the foundation program. 9 ° In addition,
each district has the option of raising incremental revenue
in a manner which is not dependent upon local wealth.'
The Phi Delta Kappa Commission on Alternative Designs
for Funding Public Education recommends a foundation
program supplemented by DPE as a viable system of school
funding. 9 ' The commission further suggests the foundation
level be kept relatively high and the DPE schedule be correspondingly low."'
4. Full [or Nearly Full] State Funding: Full state
assumption (FSA) is a school funding plan where the state,
pays for virtually all education and determines on an equitable basis, how much each school district receives."'
School districts would at best be allowed to contribute minimally from their own resources for the purpose of enrich9
ment of their local schools."'
187. See, Buse v. Smith, 247 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1976).
188. THE PHI DELTA KAPPA COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVE
PUBLIC

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

EDUCATION,

FINANCING

THE PUBLIC

DESIGNS FOR FUNDING
SCHOOLS 50 (1973).
Utah,

Kansas, and Florida have enacted programs which combine both the foundation program and DPE.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50.

ODDEN, AUGENBLOCK, AND VINCENT, SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM IN THE
STATES 48 (1976).
THE PHI DELTA KAPPA COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR FUNDING
PUBLIC EDUCATION, FINANCING THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 42 (1973).
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Opponents of full state funding argue that it would
decrease local participation by parents in public education
matters.19 They contend parent involvement in the past
has been concerned with how much revenue to raise by an
appeal to local resources.' 97 With the conversion to full state
funding, their decisions would be reduced to dividing the
"given pie" as specified by the state. 9 ' On the other hand,
those advocating total funding by the state assert there is
no reason why the level of government which raises and
appropriates the revenue must decide how it will be used,
and support the proposition that decisions concerning education rest with the lowest level of government that can
efficiently make that decision."'
Full state funding in Wyoming would require extensive
statutory and constitutional change. The twenty-five mills
special district tax 2°° and the twelve mills mandatory county
tax would have to be levied by the state. Both would require
statutory adjustment. Further, since the Wyoming Consti20
tution specifically mandates the twelve mills county levy, '
a constitutional amendment would be necessary. Significant
changes in the structure of Wyoming's education funding
system are inevitable. However, the three financing methods
previously discussed allow for greater local contribution and
would require less change to the existing system than would
full state funding.
Reform Financing Litigation
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that a statute
which required school districts to remit to the state a
portion of local property tax revenue violated the state
constitutional rule of uniform taxation.0 2 The financing
scheme contained a district power equalization factor. 0 8
196. Id. at 44.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. JOHNs, FULL STATE FUNDING OF EDUCATION 49 (1972).
200. WYO. STAT. § 21-12-101 (1977). This statute also authorizes an additional
three mills levy with voter approval.
201. WYo. CONST. art. XV, § 17.

202. Buse v. Smith, aupra note 187, at 150-55.

203. Id.
Published
by at
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Wealthy school districts would not receive any state aid,
and were instead required to pay a portion of their tax
revenue into the state fund for redistribution to other school
districts in the state."0 4 Even though education in Wisconsin
is a matter of statewide concern, and the purpose of state
recapture of local revenue was to equalize the burden upon
the property taxpayers in Wisconsin, the court concluded
that the purpose of the tax must pertain to the public purpose of the district which levies it."0 5 Classifying the tax as
local, the court stated:
But to determine whether a tax is to be classified as a state or local tax, one must look to the
entity which directly levies the tax, and which in
turn directly provides governmental benefits therefor. If that entity is the state it is a state tax. If
that entity is a political subdivision of the state, it
is a local tax. The question is who directly (and
not indirectly) levies the tax. °6
Montana's district power equalization system withstood
a constitutional attack in State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub. 7
The tax system required each county to levy a forty mills
property tax.20 Negative aid districts were required to
deposit revenue in excess of a stipulated amount in a state
account for use in positive aid districts. 20 Plaintiffs argued
that the forty mills tax levied by the county was a local
property tax, and that to tax one district for the benefit of
another constituted a taking of property without due process. 1 ' Further, plaintiffs alleged the financing statutes
violated the state's constitutional obligation to fully fund
the basic educational system. 1' The court rejected these
arguments. Crucial to the holding was the determination
that the forty mills tax levied by the county was in fact a
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id. at 152-53.
Id. at 152.
State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 530 P.2d 776 (Mont. 1974).

208. Id. at 777.
209. Id. at 777-78.
210. Id. at 780-81.
211. Id. at 780.

212. Id. at 780-83.
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state tax, because all property in the state was subject to
this levy. 1 '
In Tennant v. Sinclair Oil and Gas Company, the Wyoming Supreme Court struck down a county five mills property tax which was levied in only specified school districts.214
The tax violated article I, section 28 of the Wyoming Constitution, 15 which provides that all taxation shall be equal
and uniform. " The Montana court distinguished Sinclair
on the ground that in Woodahl the tax in issue was a uniform
levy imposed on all taxable property throughout the state,'
whereas, in Sinclair, the court dealt with a tax which was
only levied in certain school districts. ' Those in favor of
achieving equalization by having the state recapture local
tax revenue for statewide distribution in Wyoming are
divided on the question of whether a constitutional amendment is necessary. Advocates of the constitutional amendment argue that there is no compelling reason why mere
statutes enacting such a scheme would not be struck down
under the Buse v. Smith court's rationale.1 9 On the other
hand, those opposing a constitutional amendment argue that
statutory adjustment would be sufficient since the Wyoming
Supreme Court in both Hinkle and Washakie favorably discussed in dictum the feasibility of enacting a statutory plan
22
They therefore contend that it
which involved recapture°.

is unlikely the court would change direction and declare such
a plan violative of the uniform taxation provision of the
Wyoming Constitution. As will be discussed below, the 1981
legislature chose the route of amending the constitution.
213. Id. at 779, 781.
214. Tennant v. Sinclair Oil and Gas Co., 355 P.2d 887-88 (Wyo. 1960). A Wyoming Act provided for an annual tax of five mills on taxable property within each school district which did not operate a high school. The revenue
derived therefrom was to be used for certain expenses of local students
attending high school outside the school district. The Act also provided that
any surplus remaining be distributed among districts in the county which
operated high schools. Wyo SEss. LAws Ch. 158 (1959).
215. WYo. CONST. art. I, § 28.
216. Tennant v. Sinclair Oil and Gas Co., supra note 214, at 890-91.
217. State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, supra note 207, at 782.
218. Id.
219. Buse v. Smith, supra note 187, at 152.
220. Sweetwater County Planning Committee for the Organization of School
Districts v. Hinkle, supra note 116, at 1237-38; Washakie County School
supra note
1, at 335.
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WYOMING'S PROPOSED NEW SYSTEM OF
SCHOOL FUNDING

The 1981 Wyoming Legislature responded to the Wyoming Supreme Court's mandate of fiscal neutrality in the
funding of public education in Wyoming by enacting numerous statutory changes and proposing two constitutional
amendments. Further school financing legislation is expected
to be passed during the 1982 session. The supreme court
directed the district court to retain jurisdiction over the
Washakie case, 2 ' and once the entire funding scheme is
devised it will be submitted to the court for a determination
of its constitutionality.
Constitutional Amendments:
The cornerstone of the new funding plan is a proposed
amendment to article 15, sections 15 and 17 of the Wyoming
Constitution.2 The effect of these amendments is threefold: 1) The six mills state levy will be increased to a
maximum twelve mills, and the twelve mills county level
will be decreased to a maximum six mills.2 ' Obviously this
will decrease the amount of local effort and allow more
funds to be distributed from the state level, thus enabling
the state to bring poor districts up towards the level of the
rich districts. 2) The legislature will have specific constitutional authorization to permit districts to levy a special
school district tax. 4 3) The amendment adopts principles
of district power equalization by permitting the state to
recapture up to seventy-five percent of the revenue from
the special district levy in excess of a state average yield. 2
In relatively wealthy districts a specified mill levy would
raise more revenue than what that levy would raise on the
average across the state. Up to seventy-five percent of that
excess revenue would be subject to state recapture for distri221. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschier, supra note 1,
at 337.
222. WYo. CONST. art. XV, § 15; WYo. CONsT. art Xv, § 17; H.R.J. Res. No. 3,
46th Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 1981)
223. H.R.J. Res. No. 3, 46th Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 1981).
224. Id.
225. Id.

226. Wyo. STAT. § 21-13-101 (1977).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/8
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bution in relatively poor districts. Individual districts can
choose to levy a special district tax at any level up to a
maximum of twenty-five mills [with a three mills voter
override.]" 6 The constitutional amendment will provide incentive for wealthy districts to keep local effort high because
it allows them to retain at least twenty-five per cent of the
excess revenue over the state average yield for that given
levy. Incentive for relatively poor districts to maximize local
effort is provided by Section 21-13-214 of the Wyoming
Statutes, 7 which conditions state aid upon the levy of not
less than one mill below the maximum allowed special district levy without a vote of the people. 8
The proposed amendment might appear to give the
legislature free rein to recapture whatever percentage it
desires (up to seventy-five per cent) of the excess revenue
over the average yield from the special district levy; however, the Washakie court would probably circumscribe the
legislature's discretion under the amendment to the extent
necessary to adequately equalize the funding of education
statewide. For example, if only twenty per cent of eligible
special district tax revenue was being recaptured and substantial interdistrict disparity in school funding remained,
then on the basis of the state equal protection clause. 9 the
court would probably mandate a higher percentage of recapture so that more funds could be allocated to the poor
school districts.
Capital Construction Funding:
The financing of physical school facilities was one of
of school funding which the Washakie court singled
areas
the
out as being highly suspect;... however, the opinion was

vague with regard to what should be done. School construction projects are funded primarily from capital construction
227. WYO. STAT. § 21-13-314 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
228. WYo. STAT. § 21-12-314(c) (Cum. Supp. 1981).

229. WYo. CONST. art. I, § 34.
230. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note
1, at 337.

(Cum.
21-15-104
through
§§ 21-15-101
231. WYO.
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entitlements from the state,"' federal royalty revenue, 232
school district bond issues, 3 3 and occasionally from operating
revenue.
The procedures for disbursing federal royalties and
state funds for school construction were modified somewhat
by the 1981 legislature.2 34 These changes do not appear to

make significantly more school construction funds available
to poor school districts. However, the method of disbursing
both royalty money and capital entitlements appears to be
fiscally neutral even without these changes because neither
distribution scheme favors wealthy counties.
The Washakie court was probably thinking of the interdistrict disparity of available bond indebtedness, and possibly
even the disparity of available operating funds for capital
construction when it flagged the method of funding school
construction as a likely violator of the equal protection provision. 2318 If the above constitutional amendments are adopted
and if the other changes made in the funding system sufficiently equalize the availability of operating revenues among
school districts, then it necessarily follows that the disparity
in operating revenues available for school construction will
also be adequately equalized.
There still remains a disparity among school districts
in the amount that each can borrow. Ironically, the Wyoming Constitution itself is the culprit. Article XVI, section
5 of the Wyoming Constitution provides, "No school district
shall in any manner create any indebtedness exceeding ten
per cent (10%) on the assessed value of taxable property
therein for the purpose of acquiring land, erection, enlarging, and equipping of school buildings."23' 6 Consequently,
property rich school districts can borrow more money for
capital projects than property poor school districts. Appar232. Wyo.

STAT. § 9-7-901 through 9-7-904 (Cum.Supp. 1980).
233. WYO. STAT. § 21-13-701 (Cum. Supp. 1980); WYO. STAT. §§ 21-13-702
through 21-13-709 (1977); WYo. STAT. § 21-13-710 (Cum. Supp. 1980);
WYo. STAT. §§ 21-13-711 through 21-13-721 (1977).
234. H.R. 222, 46th Gen. Sess., (Wyo. 1981); H.R. 224, 46th Gen. Sess., (Wyo.
1981).
235. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note
1, at 337.
236. WYo. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/8
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ently the Washakie court requires even this disparity be
alleviated, as the opinion states:
There is no constitutional requirement that
school buildings must be built by the creation of
debt. There are other areas of consideration, for
example, a statewide reserve fund for building construction. The point is that statewide availability
from total state resources for building construction
or contribution to school buildings on a parity for
all school districts is required just as for other elements of the educational process. 3 '
Between the 1981 and 1982 sessions, the interim legislative
committee on school financing plans to examine the present
system of funding school construction.23 It is possible that
a study will be conducted by the Department of Education
in order to determine what the actual needs and disparities
are among school districts. 3 '
1981 and Proposals for 1982:
The 1981 legislature made several other changes in the
existing school funding system. The statutes authorizing the
use of up to three mills of the general county tax for school
purposes were repealed.24 An Act creating a state reserve
account to guarantee payment of school district bonds was
passed.24' Finally, Section 21-13-309 (a) of the Wyoming
Statutes was amended to provide for an increase in the
classroom unit value for the fiscal year beginning July 1,
Other Legislation-

1981.242
237. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note
1, at 337.
238. Telephone communication with Patti MacMillan, (March 2, 1981). Albany
County Legislator and member of Select Committee to Study School Finance.
239. Telephone communication with Joe Meyer of the Legislative Service Office,
on March 4, 1981. Notes on file in the Land and Water Law Review Office.
240. WYO. STAT. §§ 21-13-202 through 21-13-205 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
241. WYo. STAT. §§ 21-13-801 through 21-13-802 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
242. WYO. STAT. § 21-13-309(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981). The classroom unit is
"A measure of financial need expressed in terms of numbers of classes.
It is weighted by a system of divisors that allows a smaller number of
students per CRU in small schools." STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Thus a rural
THE WYOMING SCHOOL FOUNDATION PROGRAM V (1976).
factor is figured into the calculation of the classroom unit, and is reflected
in the amount of state aid a district receives.
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The interim committee will study and propose to the
1982 legislature further changes to be made in the school
funding system. The foundation program24 is targeted for
extensive review and readjustment. 4 ' The program is designed to consider the local wealth of each school district
and to give financial aid to the poor school districts thereby
guaranteeing each child a basic minimum education. Currently, however, not all sources of local wealth are weighed
in the foundation formula which determines what each district's entitlement from the program is.2"5 For example, of
the twenty-five mills Special District Levy, only ten mills is
' Therefore, since the vast
considered a local resource. 46
majority of school districts are levying the maximum tax
allowed without a vote of the people, 4 7 the wealthy districts
gain an advantage by not having to count revenue from up
to fifteen mills of the special district tax as a local resource.
An impact factor will also be considered for introduction into the foundation formula. The cost of education is
often higher in impacted districts. 8 Additional aid to these
districts will spread the cost of providing an equal education in high cost districts among all districts and not place
it solely on the impacted districts themselves.
The Washakie court singled out the distribution method
of school lands income as likely to contribute to the unconstitutionality of the entire system;.49 therefore, this topic
warrants serious consideration by the legislature. Currently
this revenue is distributed among all districts on the basis
of average daily membership. The court felt this did not
meet the requirements of article VII, section 8 of the Wyo243. The foundation program is "A state fund held by the State Treasurer, to
which certain receipts earmarked for schools are paid. It is supplemented
by appropriations from the legislature, and is paid to schools according to
formula."

STATE

DEPARTMENT

OF

EDUCATION,

THE

WYOMING

SCHOOL

FOUNDATION PROGRAM vi (1976).

244. Telephone communication with Joe Meyer, supra note 239.
245. See, WYo. STAT. § 21-13-310 (1977), for a list of local resources currently
computed in the foundation formula in order to determine a district's entitlement.
246. WYo. STAT. § 21-13-310 (1977).
247. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note
1, at 325-27.
248. Telephone communication with Joe Meyer, supra note 239.
249. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note
1, at 336.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/8
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ming Constitution which states, "Provision shall be made
by general law for the equitable allocation of such income
among all school districts in the state." 5 ° If distribution of
school lands income on the basis of average daily membership among the several counties of the state.5' does not, in
the court's eyes, meet the constitutional mandate of equitable allocation,. 2 then it would seem this income might best
be placed in the foundation fund in order to be distributed
on the basis of need. Indeed in a footnote to the Washakie
opinion, the court indicated that school lands income could
be included in the foundation program. 58
On the other hand, the court emphasized it was judging
the system as a whole and not condemning any particular
statute as unconstitutional. 4 Instead it was only pointing
up statutes which had a bearing upon the disparity caused
by the present system. Without drastic changes in the funding system, an enormous disparity in available resources
for school funding exists among school districts. Therefore,
under the existing system the disparity could be reduced if
school lands income were distributed to school districts on
the basis of need, rather than on the basis of average daily
membership. However, distribution of school lands income
on the basis of average daily membership does not by itself
favor wealthy districts. It merely does not respond to the
necessity of reducing the disparity of school funding among
school districts which is caused by other financing techniques
presently employed in the funding system. Consequently, if
these disparities are sufficiently equalized by other remedial
adjustments in the system, arguably the present method of
disbursing school lands income could be left unscathed.
Court and Electorate Approval:
The destiny of Wyoming's education funding system
can not be predicted with certainty, except to say that the
250. WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (Cum. Supp. 1980).

251. WYo. STAT. § 21-13-101 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
252. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note
1, at 335-36; WYO. CONST. art VII, § 8 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
253. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note
1, at 322 n. 14.
254. Id. at 335.
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system finally adopted must not substantially be a function
of local wealth. The plan proposed by the legislature faces
two critical tests. First, it must be suitable to the court."'
Second, the constitutional amendments, which are the major
components of the proposal, must be approved by the voters
of the state.2"'
How much deviation from absolute fiscal neutrality the
court will tolerate is not known. The Washakie court stated
that absolute dollar for dollar input per pupil was not required, and that adjustments should be made for certain
cost differentials. 5 7 However, allowance for cost differentials is consistent with fiscal neutrality, because it allows
for an equal educational opportunity to be provided for all
students regardless of wealth or special needs. Therefore,
the Washakie opinion did not indicate that any significant
deviation from fiscal neutrality would be permissible. On
the other hand, the Hinkle court noted in dictum that at
least some variance from strict fiscal neutrality would be
allowed." 8 The court in Hinkle stated:
... we

will not consider any invidious discrimina-

tion involved if the legislature sees fit to permit
local initiative within any district, for expenditures other than for capital improvements, to the
extent of 10 per cent or 15 per cent of the level of
income guaranteed for the district by the state in
any year. 5 '
The question of whether the court would reaffirm this
dictum is one of the many problems the legislature will have
to grapple with.
Perhaps the greatest test of the proposed new financing
system will be the vote of the electorate on the amendments
to article 15, sections 15 and 17 of the Wyoming Constitution. 0 For the amendments to pass, a majority of the quali255. Id. at 337.
256. If the proposed constitutional amendments are adopted, then they will not
be subject to judicial attack.
257. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, eupra note
1, at 336.
258. Sweetwater County Planning Committee for the Organization of School
Districts v. Hinkle, 8upra note 116, at 1238.
259. Id.
260. WYO. CONST. art XV, § 15; WYO. CONST. art. XV, § 17.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/8
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fied voters in the state must approve (not just a majority
of those voting). If the amendments are rejected in the 1982
general election, then the 1983 legislature will face the
formidable task of devising new proposals. Otherwise the
Washakie court itself will probably remedy the existing
disparity after the July 1, 1983 deadline passes."'

CONCLUSION

The Washakie court held that Wyoming's local wealth
based method of financing public education denies equal
protection.262 The equal protection analysis used by the
Wyoming Supreme Court in Washakie differs from that
used by the U.S. Supreme Court when deciding equal protection questions under the U.S. Constitution. If the analysis
used in Washakie is applied in future cases, then the court
will be assuming what would otherwise be a legislative
function.
There are many funding techniques which can be
adopted in order to achieve fiscal neutrality. The 1981 legislature proposed the first phase of a system which incorporates principles of district power equalization."' The heart
of the plan is an amendment to two sections of the Wyoming
Constitution. These proposed amendments would restructure
the method of disbursing revenue raised from property taxes
which are the primary source of school funding. They will
be voted on by the people of Wyoming at the 1982 general
election. Further changes are expected to be made by the
legislature in 1982."4 Once the entire plan is devised, it will
probably be submitted to the Wyoming court system for a
determination of its constitutionality.2 5 Whether or not the
plan presently under consideration is accepted by the court
261. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler supra note
1, at 340. Presentation given by Jack Sidi, supra note 158.
262. Washakie County School District Number One v. Herschler, supra note
1, at 332-36.
263. H.R.J. Res. No. 3, 46th Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 1981).
264. Telephone communication with Joe Meyer, upra note 239.
265. Id.
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and the voters of Wyoming, fiscal neutrality in the funding
of public education for the children of Wyoming is mandatory. If the legislature does not devise an acceptable plan,
the Wyoming Supreme Court probably will.
JOHN MAXFIELD
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